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Abstract 
It is widely acknowledged that the two major interoceanic canals of Suez and Panama play a 
central role in global shipping flows. However, this role has rarely been measured with 
precision both in terms of the geographic coverage and network topological properties of 
canal-dependent flows. Based on vessel movement data for containerships, this research 
clarifies the weight and share of canal-dependent flows globally and at the level of world 
regions, routes, and ports. It also estimates and maps the effects of removing canal-dependent 
flows from the network by means of graph-theoretical methods. While main results converge 
in showing a decreasing importance of canal shipping in the context of growing south-south 
trade exchanges, certain areas remain more dependent than others, such as Asia, Europe, and 
North America. The research also underlines factors of port vulnerability across the globe in 
relation with the two canals. 
Keywords: cascading failures, complex networks, graph theory, maritime transport, Panama, 
Suez, 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of the Suez and Panama canals is to avoid a deviation from the main trading 
routes connecting the economic centers of the world: Europe, Asia, and North America. The 
Suez and Panama canals together account for approximately 13% of the world's seaborne 
trade, thus giving them high strategic importance. The share of Suez (8%) is slightly higher 
than Panama's (5%) (Notteboom and Rodrigue, 2011). Thus, those two canals are critical 
infrastructures that raise questions of transport security (Salter, 2007), especially since many 
studies have investigated the economic potential of alternative routes in light of the 
congestion, cost, time, and piracy problems around the Suez and Panama canals (Verny and 
Grigentin, 2009; Fu et al., 2010; Liu and Kronbak, 2010; Notteboom, 2012).  
However, a few studies have  evaluated the implications of such vulnerability for canals, 
ports, and shipping networks. For instance, Berle et al. (2011) and Angeloudis et al. (2007) 
engage in a rich discussion of the failures of the maritime transportation system but without 
providing empirical evidence about the precise role of canals. In the research on network 
vulnerability and critical infrastructures, there are several studies of the worldwide energy 
supply including maritime elements (Rodrigue, 2004; Zavitsas and Bell, 2011), the Internet 
(Grubesic et al., 2008), the airline transport network (Derudder et al., 2007), and road 
networks (Jenelius et al., 2008). Early attempts to measure the centrality of interoceanic 
canals in the global maritime network were performed by Kaluza et al. (2010) and then by 
Ducruet and Notteboom (2012a) in their analysis of worldwide maritime container flows, thus 
hinting at the vulnerability of the network. Other works on maritime networks have avoided 
discussions of vulnerability, with the exception of  Guerrero et al. (2008) who described 
supply chain disruption and vessel rerouting, and the Ducruet et al. (2010) who evaluated  hub 
dependence  as a measure of vulnerability for ports. Instead, other works on liner shipping 
networks focus on the topological structure of flows (Deng et al., 2009; Hu and Zhu, 2009). 
Other studies have examined the changing pattern of port calls in contexts such as North 
Korea's global maritime linkages (Ducruet, 2008), from which Figure 1 was adapted to offer 
evidence about the function of interoceanic canals. For North Korea, the level of traffic 
through such canals symbolizes the extent of its long-distance economic interactions (e.g. the 
Black Sea), which rapidly shrunk after the fall of the USSR in the early 1990s, and have never 
recovered because of the growing dependence upon neighboring transit hubs and trade 
partners on Northeast Asia. Interoceanic canals are thus accurate markers of global trade and 
shipping activity. 
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[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
This research presents original empirical evidence about the effects of interoceanic canals on 
the distribution of global maritime flows. It draws its inspiration from a range of methods and 
applications in network analysis. Its purpose is to measure and map the vulnerability of the 
global maritime network in relation to interoceanic canals at several  geographic levels, from 
individual nodes to global sea routes. The case of container flows is explored with the 
assistance of  a global database of vessel movements in 1996 and 2006. After introducing the 
data and methodology, the first section describes the geographic coverage of the canals' 
influence on global vessel circulation and estimates their traffic weight in total container 
flows. The second section elaborates upon the topological importance of the canals and its 
evolution with regard to optimal network configurations and flow structures. A discussion of 
the local and global implications of the results follows in the last section which concludes the 
work and identifies additional pathways for future research.  
 
2. Data and methodology 
Vessel movements are reported by Lloyd's List on a daily basis. Extracting all movements of 
fully cellular container vessels in 1996 and 2006 allowed the construction of a port-to-port 
matrix that includes both Suez and Panama canals in addition to ports connected by those 
vessel calls.  The resulting network is weighted by the sum of vessel capacities in TEUs 
(Twenty-Foot Equivalent Units) passing through links and nodes during a single year of 
movements, while it is kept undirected for the sake of simplicity. The analysis distinguishes 
two dimensions of the network: the adjacency matrix of chains and the adjacency matrix of 
complete graphs (see Appendix 1 for an illustration of network analytical methods). In the 
matrix of chains, ports are considered connected when a vessels makes a direct call between 
them in the course of its route. In that configuration, the matrix consists only of calls between 
adjacent ports. In the matrix of complete graphs, all ports connected by the same vessel are 
considered connected. It thus corresponds to the matrix of chains plus all calls between non-
adjacent ports. Those two dimensions exhibit rather distinct topological properties in terms of 
network density and size (Ducruet and Notteboom, 2012a).  
One first method has been to identify the trajectory of vessels passing through each and/or 
both canals defined by their full voyage within each year of observation. The analysis of 
freight circulations through trajectories rather than segments provides more accurate results as 
it catches the overall patterns of moving objects (Guo et al., 2010). This approach allows for 
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consideration of the geographic coverage of canal-dependent shipping and its weight in 
relation to world shipping. The share of canal-dependent traffic can be calculated at every 
port, range, and continent. The method can be applied not only to total traffic but also to intra- 
and interregional traffic.  
Two drawbacks of the data and methodology merit mention, however. First, in some cases 
vessel movement data does not disclose the true origin and destination of containers. Because 
many containers are transshipped at intermediate hub ports, it is impossible to track each of 
them being embarked from one vessel to the other. Vessel movement data is thus not the same 
as trade data. Yet, all flows not passing through intermediate hub ports still have many 
overlapping trading routes, while transit flows more faithfully reflect logistics systems and 
carrier decisions in designing their networks. Second, the same vessel and its capacity in 
TEUs are counted as many times as the number of its calls during the period considered. 
Depending on the case, this might overestimate the traffic intensity of some links at the 
expense of others, such as in the case of multiple calls within certain port ranges. The true 
number of containers handled at each port cannot be inferred from the data, as some port calls 
may only relate with bunkering, but this is impossible to verify. Nevertheless, and based on 
the same database, which accounts for 92% and 98% of the world fleet of such vessels in 
1996 and 2006 respectively, the linear correlation with observed container port throughput 
figures obtained from Containerisation International is very high in both years (0.88). Port 
hierarchies measured via vessel movements thus closely overlap with those measured in more 
classic ways.  
We use two complementary approaches to assess the vulnerability of the network. On the one 
hand, average eccentricity and average transitivity are calculated for the entire network before 
and after removing canals and canal-related circulations. Such measures indicate the extent to 
which canals influence the farness and connectedness of the network. We distinguished links 
having more than 50% of their traffic being canal-related from links carrying canal-related 
traffic. This allows comparison of the differences in link removal since some inter-port links 
(e.g. Le Havre - New York) carry both canal-related and other types of traffic. Eccentricity is 
a common measure of geodesic distance in graph theory and can be labeled Koenig number, 
Shimbel distance, and closeness centrality in the literature (Ducruet and Rodrigue, 2012). 
Each node corresponds to the number of links needed to reach the most distant node in the 
network. Averaging all local measures provides one single measure at network level ranging 
from 0 (nodes are distant from each other) to 1 (nodes are close to each other). Average 
eccentricity has been used in network vulnerability studies to measure the global impact of 
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node or link removal (Shimbel, 1953; Gleyze, 2005). Transitivity is a measure of 
connectedness proposed by social network analysis (Wasserman and Faust, 1994) and labeled 
clustering coefficient in the literature on complex networks. It corresponds to the probability 
that the adjacent neighbors of a given node are also connected: the number of triangles (or 
triplets) is divided by the number of possible triangles (or triplets), thus ranging from 0 (no 
triangles) to 1 (all triangles). Low values often correspond to nodes having dominant 
functions while their immediate neighbors are poorly connected (cf. hub-and-spoke pattern) 
while high values depict tightly connected and more homogenous patterns. With reference to 
studies of cascading failures in networks, we also compare the effects of canal removal on the 
centrality of individual ports (Albert et al., 2004; Gorman et al., 2004; Wang and Rong, 
2009). 
At the same time, the optimal or maximum capacity route is extracted from the original 
network using the minimum spanning tree algorithm proposed by Kruskal (1956). The latter 
method belongs to a family of studies on the search for the optimal or shortest path on the 
level of the entire network (see also Roy, 1959; Warshall, 1962; Floyd, 1962; Johnson, 1977) 
and/or for a given node or link in the network (Bellman, 1958; Dijkstra, 1959; Ford and 
Fulkerson, 1962). The Kruskal algorithm is chosen for its simplicity and because it has 
remained a generally accepted reference in graph theory. We apply the algorithm to the 
inverse of traffic weight (TEUs) by link in order to extract the maximal weight spanning tree, 
(i.e. the optimal route connecting all ports and carrying the maximum traffic volume). Based 
on this simplification of the network, we measure for each node its Strähler stream order (i.e. 
level of ramification) to reveal the branching property of ports and canals in the optimal route, 
as well as its degree centrality (i.e. number of adjacent neighbors). The Strähler index is well 
adapted to tree-like networks and has been used extensively in the case of river networks (see 
Haggett and Chorley, 1969; Taaffe and Gauthier, 1973).  
 
3. Geographic coverage of canal-dependent flows 
Globally, the share of canal-dependent flows in total container flows was calculated on the 
basis of direct and indirect vessel calls between ports (Table 1). Results first confirm the high 
share of canal-dependent flows at both years (i.e. over 40%) which is much higher than 
available estimates for all commodity traffic. However, this combined share has noticeably 
dropped between 1996 and 2006 from 44.2% to 40.7%. This reduction stems from several 
factors such as the emergence of alternative routes (e.g. Cape of Good Hope) in response to 
vessel size limitations and passage costs. The combined share of the two canals is slightly 
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lower than the sum of their individual importance since some vessels have used both canals 
during their line-bundling and round-the-world services (Ducruet and Notteboom, 2012b). 
This confirms that true round-the-world services account for a very small percentage of global 
container flows (i.e. 6.8% in 1996 and 3.4% in 2006) since most liner services occur through 
pendulum routes between two main poles (Frémont, 2007). Yet, the combined share of the 
two canals in total interregional traffic has remained stable at around 64%. The drop is thus 
explained mostly by a reduction of canal's weight in intraregional flows. The main 
explanation pertains to the reinforced concentration of flows within certain regions around 
intermediate hub ports ensuring either (or both) interlining and hub-feeder functions 
(Rodrigue and Notteboom, 2010). This means that vessels using the canals have tended to 
limit the number of calls within regions, notably large vessels selecting a few dominant hub 
ports along the route. Another factor is the growth of transshipment across the Panamanian 
peninsula due to the physical limitations of the canal. Suez's share is higher than Panama's in 
all aspects, since the Europe-Asia route accounts for the majority of world container flows 
(27.7 million TEUs in 2007), followed by the Asia-USA route (20.3 million TEUs) and the 
Europe-USA route (7.2 million TEUs) (Containerisation International). The drop is relatively 
equal at the two canals except for interregional traffic where the Panama Canal share has 
decreased more than the Suez Canal's. This is consistent with the higher technical limitations 
of the Panama Canal in terms of vessel size, but it is not offset by an increase in its 
intraregional function.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Another approach is to measure the weight of canal-dependent flows by geographic entity at 
the world region and port levels. Among world regions (figure 2), the largest economic poles 
of the world are the most dependent upon the canals, but this dependence depends upon the 
level of flows (intra or interregional) and to the canal itself. In both years, North America is 
the most canal-dependent region and this has increased from 55% to 58% during the period 
for all flows. One reason has been the growth of all water services from Asia to the US East 
Coast, at the expense of landbridge services and favoring ports such as Savannah (see also 
Appendix 2). Indeed, the share of Panama canal on the Northeast Asia-US East Coast route 
has grown steadily from 11.3% in 1999 to 43% in 2007 (Rodrigue, 2010). It is followed by 
Europe but its canal-dependence dropped slightly from 51% to 49%. Asia and Latin America 
exhibit similar levels of  dependence and their share has also dropped from 42% to 36%. 
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While Africa's dependence remains stable at the lowest level (20%), Oceania has witnessed 
the highest increase, from 17% in 1996 to 29% in 2006. A complementary picture is obtained 
when distinguishing interregional from intraregional flows. In fact, Europe and Asia are the 
most canal-dependent regions since about 75% of their external traffic relies on the canals, 
and this share has remained stable between 1996 and 2006. Their drop in canal-dependence 
thus better reflects the decrease of intraregional canal-related flows because of the growth of 
transshipment at intermediate hub ports, such as in the Mediterranean and South East Asian 
ranges. In comparison, North America's canal-dependence is lower externally and higher 
internally (inter-coastal flows), but both shares have increased significantly, amounting to 
59% of interregional flows and 54% of intraregional flows in 2006. The growing dependence 
upon canals (here Panama) might be explained by congestion at West Coast ports, making 
land bridge connections less beneficial to shippers than canal shipping (Hall, 2004). Latin 
America has a lower canal-dependence than North America but both interregional (-3%) and 
intraregional (-8%) canal-dependence have decreased, which indicates a diversification of its 
connections.  
The distribution of canal-dependent flows among major shipping routes underlines, 
predictably, the central role of Suez Canal for Europe-Asia traffic (95%), the rest being 
shipped via the Cape route. It is the largest and most canal-dependent traffic segment. The 
Europe-Oceania route also passes through Suez, although one-third of the traffic uses the 
Panama Canal instead.  
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
The analysis at port level allows for a clearer observation of trafficmpacts (Figure 3). The 
combined traffic of the two canals is distributed along the circumterrestrial route linking the 
three main economic poles. A noticeable number of ports appears highly vulnerable in the 
pattern of flows since a dominant share of their traffic is transported through the canals. The 
distribution of vulnerability rests upon a subtle combination of distance and scale: on the one 
hand proximity to the canals fosters traffic, and on the other, larger hubs and gateways, often 
despite distance to the canals, generate high volumes and shares of canal-related traffic. In 
general, Asian ports appear to be less dependent on canals than their European and North 
American counterparts, probably as a result of their higher levels of intra-regional traffic. 
Indeed, transpacific trades have more options to enter the North American continent than does 
the Europe-Asia trade, which has to alternative to using the Suez Canal. In addition, new 
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Pacific gateways have been planned to connect long-distance rail corridors to bypass the 
Panama Canal, such as Lazaro Cardenas (Mexico) and Prince Ruppert (Canada). The 
vulnerability is thus much localized in certain areas: the U.S. Northeastern seaboard (Panama 
traffic) and a number of West European ports (Suez traffic) such as Southampton and Gioia 
Tauro at both years. The Panama Canal that is often seen as a key node for Asia-North 
America trades has in fact relatively little importance for Asian ports. The share of Suez 
traffic at Asian ports has notably decreased for Singapore and for several Northeast Asian 
ports. Thus, there is a combination of liner service reconfiguration and trade reorientation in 
the changing geographic coverage of canal traffic. Appendix 2 lists the top 30 ports based on 
canal-dependent traffic. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
4. Topological impacts of interoceanic canals 
4.1 Canal removal and cascading failures 
 
Average eccentricity and transitivity were calculated at both years on the network level before 
and after removing partly and fully each or both canal's circulations, while comparing effects 
for the two dimensions, chains and complete graphs (Table 2). In the matrix of chains, results 
from 1996 confirm the crucial role of canals in bringing world ports closer, as eccentricity 
decreases after removals compared with the original value (0.765). The combined effect of the 
two canals is not clearly visible since it is equal to Suez deletion impacts (for largest flows) 
and inferior to the Suez deletion impacts (for all flows). The largest difference in eccentricity 
is observed for the Suez Canal (0.674); removing the Panama Canal's links and flows does not 
have much influence upon the network's structure. This confirms previous results where the 
geographic coverage of Panama Canal's flows remained much narrower than that of the Suez 
Canal. In 2006, the original eccentricity is significantly lower than in 1996 (0.644), which in 
itself indicates a dramatic increase in the size and geographic coverage of the liner shipping 
network (Ducruet and Notteboom, 2012a), thus increasing the distance between ports. One 
notable difference with 1996 is that removing canal-related circulations, either individually or 
in combination, increases the eccentricity thus bringing the ports closer to each other. This 
counterintuitive result can be explained in light of crucial trends occurring along the period. In 
1996, remote regions remain poorly connected so that the role of the canals is central and 
there are few bypasses. The progression of South-South flows between Latin America, Africa, 
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and Asia-Pacific as well as the relatively stagnant share of the canals in total flows (from 50 
to 56%) have resulted in a less sparse network. Removing canal-related circulations thus 
reveals the strength of those new transversal linkages among world economies. This is why 
the Suez Canal has the highest impact on making ports closer: Asia and Europe are closer 
outside the Suez canal when considering the expanding links between Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America, the two latter being still well connected with Europe. The role of canals in an era of 
growing South-South trade appears more as a bottleneck than a facilitator of exchanges.  
In the matrix of complete graphs, the impact of canal removal is similar to the latter 
dimension. Transitivity increases as more canal-dependent circulations are removed, while the 
impact is more pronounced for Suez Canal and combined canals. As with chains, the effects 
are larger in 2006 than in 1996 because of the increasing centralization of the network around 
hub ports. Eccentricity always increases along with canal removal, because complete graphs 
allow for the existence of many alternative paths outside the canal nodes. Thus, removing 
canal-dependent circulations brings ports closer to each other than dismantling the network's 
structure would. In terms of transitivity, the same trend is observed in 1996 and 2006: the 
increasing polarization of the network after the removal of canal-related circulations. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Before looking at the effects of removal on ports, it is necessary to evaluate the extent to 
which the two canals centrally located in terms of network topology compare with other 
nodes (Figure 4). In the global network, the two canals clearly appear at both years as two 
central nodes in the global system, as connectors between a Euromediterranean-Atlantic 
group and an Asia-Pacific group, alongside very limited flows between the two. Each group at 
both years is polarized by few large ports, based on betweenness centrality scores. Rotterdam 
and Singapore are the most central ports of the group to which they belong, followed by 
Antwerp, Hamburg, Hong Kong, and Busan, in that order. In 2006, Bremerhaven and 
Shanghai emerge as complementary hubs, while there is a noticeable shrinkage in the 
centrality of European gateways in 2006. In addition, more links seem to connect the two 
main components while circumventing the canals. Nevertheless and although it has fewer 
links than major seaports, the Suez Canal is by far most central node of the global network in 
both years.  
 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
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Because betweenness centrality more accurately expresses the global situation of port nodes 
in relation to other nodes, the analysis of removal impacts was applied to this measure for the 
matrix of chains. For each year, each canal with its related links was individually and jointly 
removed. Betweenness centrality scores were compared before and after removal in both 
absolute (difference between new and former centrality) and relative (ratio between new and 
former centrality) ways and mapped in order to verify the geographic coverage of such 
impacts (Figures 5a and 5b). With few exceptions, European ports had larger negative impacts 
than other ports, regardless of the canal and year under consideration. Europe thus appears 
much vulnerable in the network, in light of its longstanding centralization of world trade 
flows. As Europe's largest gateway, Rotterdam has the strongest negative impact on each 
map, except for 1996, when the Panama Canal was removed. Positive impacts of canal 
removal are more pronounced in the southern hemisphere such as around Brazil, South 
Africa, and the Malacca Straits with Singapore. The removal of both canals does not 
drastically modify the distribution of impacts from individual removals. Results, however, 
vary greatly within each region and may vary according to the canal and change over time.  
One major difference between 1996 and 2006 is the location of the highest absolute gain, 
which has shifted from South Africa (e.g. Durban, Cape Town) to Brazil (e.g. Santos, Rio de 
Janeiro). Another noticeable difference is that several major North American ports which felt 
negative impacts in 1996 had positive impacts in 2006 (e.g. New York, Houston, and 
Kingston, Jamaica). Such changes are certainly interdependent, given the growing trade and 
shipping integration between North and South America (Guy, 2003).  
Another factor is the growth and geographic diversification of Asia's trade networks and the 
"China effect" to the extent that many flows have rapidly expanded towards southern Atlantic 
ports, circumventing Suez and even South Africa, based on increased frequency and capacity 
of vessel trips between China and Brazil, for instance. This also confirms that Latin America's 
East Coast ports barely use the Panama Canal (Figure 3) Over the same period, Africa has 
almost entirely shifted its principal maritime links towards Asia (Ducruet and Notteboom, 
2012a), which explains the centrality gains of Shanghai and several West African ports in 
2006. Positive effects are also observed at certain ports having important transshipment 
functions locally, because of their dominance in neighboring secondary ports, such as 
Colombo and Piraeus in 1996 (but not in 2006), Marsaxlokk and Gioia Tauro in 2006 (but not 
in 1996). However and despite its strong transshipment activity towards Japan and North 
China, Busan was negatively affected by removals, especially Suez, although in 2006, the 
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impact was positive for Panama and both canals. Lastly, another important difference between 
1996 and 2006 is the reversed mutual effects  between the canals themselves, as Panama 
benefitted from Suez removal in 1996 but not in 2006, and vice versa.  
 
[Insert Figures 5a and 5b about here] 
 
4.2 Optimal routes and ramifications 
After extracting the optimal route from the original matrix, we map the centrality and 
ramification level of ports and canals using a Gem-Frick visualization algorithm (Figure 6). 
The design of the optimal route confirms the presence of two large subsystems or sub-trees, 
each polarized by Rotterdam and Singapore, which have the largest number of adjacent 
neighbours (degree) and a high level of ramification (Strähler). In 1996, the Suez Canal has 
the highest ramification level as it stands, with Djibouti, Reunion, and Aden at the source of 
the global tree. The centre of gravity of the global maritime system was thus clearly around 
the Suez Canal but it shifted to other locations in 2006. Singapore in addition to several  Latin 
American ports (e.g.  Vitoria, Santos, Paranagua, Port of Spain, Kingston), took over Suez 
Canal at the source of the optimal route. This corroborates previous results since Asian traffic 
has penetrated the Atlantic through direct calls bypassing the Suez Canal (i.e. around the Cape 
of Good Hope). Many African ports have shifted under Asian influence due to the rapid 
development of Asian Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Africa (Chaponnière, 2010). 
Emerging economies such as Brazil have generated increasing volumes of flows linking not 
only Asia but also traditional partners such as Europe and the U.S. (see also Guy, 2003), thus 
becoming a new gravity centre for global shipping. Notably, the interlining function of 
Algeciras that appeared in 1996 for connecting East-West and North-South flows was 
considerably reduced in 2006 since Durban in South Africa appears as a new relay hub 
between West Africa and Asia. Taken together, we observe a significant shrinkage of 
Rotterdam's influence in the network as an effect of these factors. The sub-network, including 
New York, Houston, Casablanca, and a number of Atlantic European ports was connected to 
Hong Kong via the Brazilian port of Itajai in 2006. Although the method has removed many 
links that connect ports in more complex ways, the resulting pattern is by no means revelatory 
of profound changes in network configurations.  
 
[Insert Figure 6 about here] 
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The same method applied to the matrix of complete graphs provides complementary results 
although many indirect and long-distance links between ports such as Rotterdam-Tokyo 
would not have existed without canals. Due to the many alternatives in this dimension of the 
network, canals appear to have had a minor role in both years on the optimal route. Interesting 
configurations and evolutions are, nevertheless, observable. In 1996, European ports are 
clearly dominant in both centrality and ramification, as are Asian ports that appear more 
peripheral. In 2006, it is the opposite: Asian ports dominate the optimal route while European 
(and other) ports are relegated to the semi-periphery.  
 
Conclusion 
The application of several network analytical methods to the global matrix of inter-port vessel 
movements offers many insights into the changing role of canals and ports in liner shipping 
flows. As such, it informs us about the ways on which shipping networks both reflect and 
shape the world economy and its components (Ullman, 1949; Vigarié, 1968). As a 
complement to studies of network vulnerability, this research provides evidence of the 
distribution of canal-related flows and their wider significance for ports and shipping. After 
providing a novel estimation of the importance of canal traffic in global container flows, the 
research revealed the uneven geographic coverage of the canal's influence at different levels 
of analysis. While canal traffic concentrates at the vicinity of those major infrastructures, it 
reveals the higher vulnerability of the "old Atlantic world" compared with emerging countries 
such as in the Asia-Pacific and South Atlantic regions. Canals' role in global shipping has thus 
declined during the period under study (1996-2006) as an effect of growing South-South 
trades and Asia's expansion across the Cape of Good Hope. Former structures, such as 
Rotterdam's prominence as the main hub of Europe-Atlantic networks, are thus losing ground, 
since Latin American ports have assumed a new role in network interlining. Yet, there is a 
permanency of a bipolarization of the world organized by Singapore and Rotterdam, which 
remain the main pivotal nodes, but Rotterdam and Europe as a whole appear much more 
vulnerable than any other port.  
Further research shall test the continuity of such trends by applying these methods to other 
commodity types (e.g. bulk, general cargo) and to more recent data, as a means taking into 
account, too, the likely impacts of the 2008 global financial crisis and of the development of 
slow steaming, on network configurations, in addition to the future effects of the expansion of 
the Panama Canal. Based on these results, such expansion might have three combined effects: 
balancing the overarching polarization of global container flows by the Suez Canal, 
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reinforcing the already high canal-dependence of North American ports, and providing more 
alternatives to European ports to connect Asia. What it might not change, however, is the 
rapid and ongoing integration among emerging economic powers, such as China, Brazil, but 
also in Africa, through South-South shipping networks. Current and future patterns will also 
benefit from their comparison with the geo-historical evolution of worldwide maritime flows 
based on same sources (see Ducruet, 2013) but also local data about the origin and destination 
of vessels passing through the canals since their opening. The way traffic is counted by port, 
link, and region may also be done less uniformly, for instance by adapting vessel traffic 
figures to actual container port throughputs in order to reduce the influence of transhipment. 
Modelling and simulation methods could, in addition, predict the likely effects of opening 
new shipping routes and of canal disruption or expansion. 
 
[Insert Appendices 1 and 2 about here] 
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Table 1: Importance of canal-dependent flows in global container flows (% TEUs) 
 Panama Canal Suez Canal Panama & Suez 
1996 2006 1996 2006 1996 2006 
Total traffic 17.0 13.3 34.0 30.8 44.2 40.7 
Intraregional traffic 10.7 8.0 24.6 21.8 31.8 27.8 
Interregional traffic 26.8 23.1 48.8 47.6 63.7 64.4 
Source: own calculation based on Lloyd's List 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Topological effects of removing interoceanic canals in 1996 and 2006 
 
Matrix of chains Matrix of complete graphs 
Eccentricity Transitivity Eccentricity Transitivity 
1996 2006 1996 2006 1996 2006 1996 2006 
Original network 0.765 0.644 0.527 0.517 0.623 0.628 0.747 0.737 
Without links 
> 50% canal-
related traffic 
Panama 0.762 0.666 0.489 0.492 0.728 0.629 0.723 0.714 
Suez 0.698 0.742 0.444 0.476 0.730 0.635 0.683 0.684 
Both 0.698 0.739 0.417 0.436 0.734 0.723 0.465 0.453 
Without all 
canal-related 
links 
Panama 0.749 0.707 0.451 0.394 0.733 0.762 0.638 0.598 
Suez 0.674 0.731 0.399 0.413 0.726 0.762 0.571 0.550 
Both 0.688 0.720 0.349 0.267 0.767 0.803 0.375 0.345 
Source: own calculation based on Lloyd's List data and TULIP software 
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Figure 1. North Korea’s traffic via interoceanic canals, 1985–2006. 
 
Source: Own realization based on data from Lloyd’s List Intelligence 
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Figure 2. Canal-dependent traffic by route and region in 1996 and 2006 
 
Source: Own realization based on data from Lloyd’s List Intelligence 
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Figure 3. Canal-dependent traffic at world ports in 1996 and 2006 
 
Source: Own realization based on data from Lloyd’s List Intelligence 
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Figure 4. Global network structure and node centrality in 1996 and 2006 
 
Source: Own realization based on data from Lloyd’s List Intelligence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
Figure 5. Centrality impacts of canal removal in 1996 and 2006 
 
Source: Own realization based on data from Lloyd’s List Intelligence 
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Appendix 1: Methodology for network construction and analysis 
 
Source: own elaboration 
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Appendix 2: Canal-dependent traffics at largest ports of the world in 1996 and 2006 
1996 2006 
Port P+S PAN SUEZ Port P+S PAN SUEZ 
Singapore 57.9 6.8 57.4 Hong Kong 56.3 15.1 45.6 
Hong Kong 52.5 11.9 47.4 Suez Canal 100.0 7.0 100.0 
Suez Canal 100.0 9.9 100.0 Panama Canal 100.0 100.0 19.3 
Panama Canal 100.0 100.0 31.0 Singapore 49.0 4.2 47.8 
Kaohsiung 53.6 17.4 45.3 Shenzhen 72.0 21.2 56.3 
Rotterdam 67.9 17.7 60.7 Busan 47.5 20.8 32.1 
Los Angeles 54.3 41.9 31.5 Shanghai 53.5 18.8 40.8 
Hamburg 75.7 17.6 71.8 Kaohsiung 49.8 14.5 37.7 
Busan 53.7 20.1 45.4 Rotterdam 74.1 11.4 66.8 
Le Havre 74.2 26.2 67.3 Ningbo 64.3 15.7 55.0 
Colombo 87.1 18.9 87.1 Hamburg 76.4 6.9 73.6 
Kobe 37.8 14.3 25.5 Port Klang 50.7 7.8 50.1 
Tokyo 47.1 17.5 38.8 New York 76.8 58.9 28.8 
Jeddah 98.3 4.3 98.3 Savannah 92.9 86.1 27.3 
Felixstowe 65.9 20.6 56.6 Jeddah 89.8 5.7 89.5 
New York 76.3 63.3 38.0 Manzanillo(PAN) 94.0 94.0 14.6 
Yokohama 33.4 14.7 20.7 Tokyo 45.7 24.8 23.7 
Nagoya 38.3 13.2 30.2 Colombo 67.1 9.3 66.6 
Antwerp 63.3 25.8 54.9 Qingdao 57.6 15.1 46.0 
Osaka 49.5 24.0 39.3 Xiamen 57.9 7.8 54.3 
San Francisco 44.2 29.9 26.1 Oakland 51.9 28.6 26.8 
Southampton 96.6 2.3 96.5 Yokohama 37.0 22.9 16.6 
Port Klang 45.6 5.3 45.6 Felixstowe 68.4 6.8 65.7 
Bremerhaven 57.1 32.1 40.6 Kobe 43.0 23.0 22.0 
Manzanillo(PAN) 95.4 95.4 13.5 Jebel Ali 52.2 4.6 51.6 
Keelung 26.9 10.3 21.9 Los Angeles 54.2 28.5 32.0 
Savannah 92.8 89.3 28.3 Tanjung Pelepas 77.0 8.0 74.6 
Charleston 64.4 46.7 35.3 Long Beach 53.2 27.1 30.8 
Cristobal 95.1 95.1 61.9 Charleston 64.0 50.7 24.7 
Shimizu 61.6 12.2 61.3 Bremerhaven 61.0 18.6 46.6 
Barcelona 65.0 18.8 49.0 Nagoya 37.6 17.1 22.5 
Buenaventura 90.4 88.4 3.1 Antwerp 59.2 14.1 47.4 
Source: own elaboration based on Lloyd's List data 
N.B. ports are ranked in decreasing order based on total canal-dependent traffic at each year 
 
 
